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Lecture

Professor David Peimer
Gallipoli (1915): Churchill’s Disaster?

Saturday 29.06.2024

Summary

The Battle of Gallipoli was a defining moment in World War I. In response to the horrors of war, Winston Churchill asked, “Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?” The second front was then created in Gallipoli, resulting in catastrophe. Although it was not his idea, Churchill was ultimately blamed for the disaster. In this lecture, David Peimer examines what really happened, exposing the incompetence, political intrigue and hubris among leadership in the Allied Forces and how they influenced World War II. He also explores the portrayal of the historical event in the 1981 film, “Gallipoli.”

Professor David Peimer

head and shoulders portrait of david peimer looking at camera, smiling

David Peimer is a professor of theatre and performance studies in the UK. He has taught at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and New York University (Global Division), and was a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University. Born in South Africa, David has won numerous awards for playwriting and directing. He has written eleven plays and directed forty in places like South Africa, New York, Brussels, London, Berlin, Zulu Kingdom, Athens, and more. His writing has been published widely and he is the editor of Armed Response: Plays from South Africa (2009) and the interactive digital book Theatre in the Camps (2012). He is on the board of the Pinter Centre in London.

He claimed to have learned never to underestimate the enemy, no matter who it was, certainly if the enemy was part of the superior, inferior binary that empire sets up, that the conquered are always going to be inferior. Secondly, to organise, plan, organise, plan, organise, plan.

It was the start of a major change. Gallipoli became a massive change, not only in terms of the colonies relating to London as the centre but also who’s taking orders from who in both military and political contexts. It also begins the change in the British army itself. The unquestioning of hierarchy with two or three at the top starts to get really challenged.

He was a hell of a lot more cautious, over planning, understanding every detail imaginable and putting it off as long as possible.